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Abstract
Bayesian reasoning is applied to the data by the ROG Collaboration, in which grav-
itational wave (g.w.) signals are searched for in a coincidence experiment between
Explorer and Nautilus. The use of Bayesian reasoning allows, under well defined hy-
potheses, even tiny pieces of evidence in favor of each model to be extracted from the
data. The combination of the data of several experiments can therefore be performed
in an optimal and efficient way. Some models for Galactic sources are considered and,
within each model, the experimental result is summarized with the likelihood rescaled
to the insensitivity limit value (“R function”). The model comparison result is given in
in terms of Bayes factors, which quantify how the ratio of beliefs about two alternative
models are modified by the experimental observation.
1 Introduction
A recent analysis of data from the resonant g.w. detectors Explorer and Nautilus [1]
has shown some hints of a possible signal over the background expected from random
coincidences. The indication appears only when the data are analyzed as a function of
the sidereal time. Reference [1] does not contain statements concerning the probability
that some of the observed coincidences could be due to g.w.’s rather than background.
Only bottom plots of Fig. 5 and Fig. 7 of that paper gives p-values (the meaning of
‘p-value‘, to which physicists are not accustomed, will be clarified later) for each bin
in sidereal time, given the average observed background at that bin. But p-values are
not probabilities that the ‘only background’ hypothesis is true, though they are often
erroneously taken as such, leading to unpleasant consequences in the interpretation of
the data [2]. Indeed, in this case too, Fig. 5 and Fig. 7 of Ref. [1] might have produced
in some reader sentiments different from those of the members of the ROG Collab-
oration, who do not believe with high probability to have observed g.w.’s. However,
the fact remains that the data are somewhat intriguing, and it is therefore important
to quantify how much we can reasonably believe the hypothesis that they might con-
tain some g.w. events. The aim of this paper is to show how to make a quantitative
assessment of how much the experimental data prefer the different models in hand.
The choice of the Bayesian approach is quite natural to tackle these kind of prob-
lems, in which we are finally interested in the comparison of the probabilities that
different models could explain the observed data. In fact, the concept of probability of
hypotheses, probability of ‘true values’, probability of causes, etc., are only meaning-
ful in this approach. The alternative (‘frequentistic’) approach forbids to speak about
probability of hypotheses. Frequentistic ‘hypothesis test’ results are given in terms
of ‘statistical significance’, a concepts which notoriously confuses most practitioners,
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Figure 1: Explorer-Nautilus coincidence events (upper plot) and background estimates
(lower plot) as a function of the sidereal time in 1/2 hour bins.
since it is commonly (incorrectly!) interpreted as it would be the probability of the
‘null hypothesis’ [2]. Moreover, this approach provides only ‘accepted/rejected’ con-
clusions, and thus it is not suited to extract evidence from noisy data and to combine it
with other evidence provided by other data.
In the next section we present shortly the experimental data, referring to Ref. [1]
and references therein for details. Then we review how the problem is approached
in conventional statistics, explaining the reasons why we think that is unsatisfactory.
Finally, we illustrate the Bayesian alternative for parametric inference and model com-
parison, and apply it to the ROG data.
2 Experimental data
This analysis has been performed on a data set of Explorer-Nautilus coincidences with
an energy filter veto (i.e. requiring agreement between the event energies of the two
antennae) and with a fixed time window of ±0.5 s. Data we are referring to are those
obtained using runs longer than 12 hours. The data are grouped in half hour bins of
sidereal time, as shown in Fig. 1. The upper plot of the figure reports the number of
observed coincidences (nc), while the lower plot gives the average number of the back-
ground events estimated by off-time techniques. It is worth remarking that the method
we are going to use does not depend critically on the width of the bins, provided that
the width is small enough to assure a good resolution of the antenna pattern. (To state
it clearly, contrary to other methods in which some binning is required and the re-
sulting significance depends dramatically on the choice of the binning, in our method
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we could have, virtually, bins of arbitrary small width. Rebinning does not spoils the
quality of the information, as long as the binning is finer than the structures exhibited
by the antenna pattern and there are no clustering of events within a bin. The latter
possibility is excluded by inspecting the arrival time of the individual events, as shown
in Ref. [1] for the events around 4:00.)
As far as the background is concerned, we recall that the random coincidence back-
ground is well described by a Poisson distribution [1], and that the sidereal hour fluc-
tuations of the averages is compatible with the grand average over the 24 hours of
0.57± 0.03 events/hour. For these reasons, we believe that the the value of λB = 0.57
is the most reasonable value to use as parameter of the Poisson distribution which
models the background fluctuation in the 0.5-hour bins.
3 P-value analysis of the ‘statistical significance’ of the
data
P-value is the term preferred in modern statistics to describe what physicists call, in
simple words, “probability of the tail(s),” or “probability to observe the events actually
observed, or rarer ones, given a null hypothesis” (note ‘given’: the probability of what-
ever has been observed, without the specification of a particular condition, is always
unity). In the frequentistic approach, the null hypothesis is rejected with a significance
level α if the p-value gets below α, where α is typically chosen to be 5% or 1%. Be-
sides the recognized misinterpretation of the p-value result (see e.g. [2]), there are
often disputes about how this reasoning should be applied, because it is easy to show
that there is much arbitrariness in the kind of test to be performed (it is well known
that practitioner often seeks for the test that tells what they like, moving for χ2-test,
to run-test and to other tests with fancy names, if the previously tried tests were “not
sensitive to the effect”) and in the data to include in the test, as it is sketched in the
following subsections.
3.1 P-value based on the overall number of events
The expected number of events due to the null hypothesis H0 = “only background” is
27.4 (= 0.57× 48). Having observed 34 events we get:
p-value|integral = P (nc ≥ 34 | PλB=27.4) = 12% , (1)
a value that it is not considered ‘significative’. However, the obvious criticism to this
procedure is that we have only used the integrated number of coincidences, losing
completely the detailed information provided by the time distribution. The problem
can be better understood in the limiting case of 1000 bins, an expected background of
1 event/bin, and an experimental result in which 999 bins have contents which ‘nicely’
(Poisson) fluctuate around 1, and a single bin exhibiting a spike of 31 counts. The
p-value would be of 16%, accepting the hypothesis that the data are explained well by
background alone.
3.2 P-value based on the bin presenting the highest excess
The naı¨ve solution to this paradox is to calculate a p-value using only the bin presenting
the highest fluctuation. This approach would give a very small number (0.5× 10−36)
in our 1000 bin example, and would remain below the 1% threshold even if the spike
has only 5 events over a background of 1. Applying this reasoning to the ROG data we
get
p-value|max = P (nc ≥ 4 | PλB=0.57) = 2.8× 10
−3 , (2)
3.3 P-value based on the argument that the highest excess could have shown up
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a p-value which may be considered ‘significative’. (Note that, if we used the observed
background of Fig. 1, that we do not believe it is the correct number to use, the p-value
would be 5.2× 10−4 .)
3.3 P-value based on the argument that the highest excess could
have shown up everywhere in the time distribution
Again, the previous procedure can be easily criticized, because “the bin to which the
test has been applied has been chosen after having observed the data, while a peak
would have been arisen, a priori, everywhere in the plot.” The standard procedure to
overcome this criticism is to calculate the probability that a peak of that or higher value
would have shown up everywhere in the data, i.e.
p-value|scan = 1−
nbin∏
i=1
F (3 | PλB ) , (3)
where nbin is the number of bins and F (·) stands for the cumulative distribution (the
product in Eq. (3) is based on the assumption of independence of the bins). In our case
we get 13% or 23% depending whether a constant or varying background is assumed,
i.e. p-values above any over-optimistic choice of the p-value threshold.
It is interesting to note that the 13% p-value can be reobtained approximately as
p-value|scan ≈ nbin× p-value|max, showing that even a very pronounced excess can
be considered not significant if a large number of observational bins are involved in the
experiment (and practitioners restrict arbitrary the region to which the test is applied,
if they want the test to state what they would like. . . ). The dependence of the result of
the method on observations far from the region where there could be a good physical
reason to have a signal is annoying (and for this reason, practitioners who choose a
suitable region around the peak do, intuitively, something correct. . . ). On the other
hand, the reasoning does not take into account that other bins could be interested by
the signal.
We shall see in Sec. 4.3 how to use properly the prior knowledge that a (physically
motivated) signal could have appeared everywhere in the histogram.
3.4 Why not to use p-values
To conclude this section, let us summarize the reasons for not to use procedures based
on p-values.
• The interpretation of p-values is misleading, because they do not provide proba-
bilities of hypotheses, though they sound and are commonly interpreted as such.
• Methods based on p-values pretend to provide answers only based on the statis-
tical properties of the null hypothesis, without taking into account if other hy-
potheses are conceivable, and how the alternative hypotheses describe the data.
For example, these methods do not take into account the fact that a supposed sig-
nal appears at a given place rather than elsewhere, which bins could be affected
by a physical model and how reasonable a model is.
• These methods provide only binary answers, accepted/rejected. As a conse-
quence they are not efficient enough to analyze rare phenomena, which can only
be discovered by a proper combination of (even very) small pieces of evidence.
4 The Bayesian way out: how to use of experimental data to update the credibility of
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4 The Bayesian way out: how to use of experimental
data to update the credibility of hypotheses
We think that the solution to the above problems consists in changing radically our
attitude, instead of seeking for new ‘prescriptions’ which might cure a trouble but gen-
erate others. The so called Bayesian approach, based on the natural idea of probability
as ‘degree of belief’ and on the rules of logic, seems to us to be the proper way to deal
with our problem. A key role in this approach is played by Bayes’ theorem, which,
apart from normalization constant, can be stated as
P (Hi |Data, I0) ∝ P (Data |Hi, I0) · P (Hi | I0) , (4)
where Hi stand the hypotheses that could produce the Data with likelihood P (Data |
Hi, I0). P (Hi |Data, I0) and P (Hi | I0) are, respectively, the posterior and prior
probabilities, i.e. with or without taking into account the information provided by
the Data. I0 stands for the general status of information, which is usually considered
implicit and will then be omitted in the following formulae.
The presence of priors, considered a weak point by opposer’s of the Bayesian the-
ory, is one of the points of force of the theory. First, because priors are necessary to
make the ‘probability inversion’ of Eq. (4). Second, because in this approach all rel-
evant conditions must be clearly stated, instead of being hidden in the method or left
to the arbitrariness of the practitioner. Third, because prior knowledge can be properly
incorporated in the analysis to integrate missing or deteriorated experimental informa-
tion (and whatever it is done should be stated explicitly!). Finally, because the clear
separation of prior and likelihood in Eq. (4) allows to publish the results in a way inde-
pendent from P (Hi | I0), if the priors might differ largely within the members of the
scientific community. In particular, the Bayes factor, defined as
BFij =
P (Data |Hi)
P (Data |Hj)
, (5)
is the factor which changes the ‘bet odds’ (i.e. probability ratios) in the light of the
new data. In fact, dividing member to member Eq. (4) written for hypotheses Hi and
Hj , we get
posterior oddsij = BFij · prior oddsij . (6)
Since we shall speak later about modelsMi, the odd ratio updating is given by
P (Mi |Data)
P (Mj |Data)
=
P (Data |Mi)
P (Data |Mj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bayes factor
·
P◦(Mi)
P◦(Mj)
(7)
Some general remarks are in order.
• Conclusions depend only on the observed data and on the previous knowledge.
In particular they do not depend on unobserved data which are rarer than the data
really observed (that is what p-values imply).
• At least two models have to be taken into account, and the likelihood for each
model must be specified.
• There is no need to consider ‘all possible models’, since what matters are relative
beliefs.
• Similarly, there is no need that the model must be declared before the data are
taken, or analyzed. What matters is that the initial beliefs should be based on
general arguments about the plausibility of each model and on agreement with
other experimental information, other than Data.
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An analogue of Eq. (4) applies to the parameters of a model. For example, if, given a
modelM, we are interested to the rate of g.w. on Earth, r, Bayes’ theorem gives
f(r |Data,M) ≈ f(Data | r,M)× f◦(r,M) , (8)
where f() stand for probability density functions (pdf) Also in this case, a prior in-
dependent way of reporting the result is possible. The difficulty of dealing with an
infinite number of Bayes factors (precisely∞2, given each ri and rj) can be overcome
defining a functionR of r which gives the Bayes factor with respect to a reference r◦.
This function is particularly useful if r◦ is chosen to be the asymptotic value at which
the experiment looses completely sensitivity. For g.w. search this asymptotic value is
simply r → 0. In other cases it could be an infinite particle mass [3] or an infinite mass
scale [4]. In the case of g.w. rate r, extensively discussed in Ref. [5], we get
RM(r) =
f(Data | r,M)
f(Data | r = 0,M)
=
LM(r)
LM(r = 0)
, (9)
where LM(r) is the model dependent likelihood. [Note that, indeed, in the limit of
r → 0 the likelihood depends only on the background expectation and not on the
specific model. Therefore LM(r = 0) → LM◦ , where M◦ stands for the model
“background alone”.] This R function has the meaning of relative belief updating
factor [5], since it tells us how we must modify our beliefs of the different values
of r, given the observed data. In the region where R vanishes, the corresponding
values of r are excluded. On the other hand, in the region where R is about unity,
the data are unable to change our beliefs, i.e. we have lost sensitivity. The region of
transition between 0 and 1 defines the sensitivity bound, a concept that does not have a
probabilistic meaning and, since it does not refers to terms such as ‘confidence’, does
not cause the typical misinterpretations of the frequentistic ‘confidence upper/lower
limits’ (for a recent example of results using these ideas see Ref. [8]). Values of r
preferred by the data are spotted by large value of R. We shall in the sequel how a
plot of the R function gives an immediate representation of what the data tell about a
parameter (Figs. 3 and 4). Another interesting feature of this function is that, if several
independent data sets are available, each providing some information about modelM,
the global information is obtained multiplying the variousR functions:
RM(r ; All data) =
∏
i
RM(r ; Datai) . (10)
4.1 Models for Galactic sources of gravitational waves
Having seen that the analysis has to be based on models for the emission of g.w.’s, let us
focus on some popular models within Galaxy. This limitation is due to the sensitivity
of the ROG detectors. The models taken into account are: emission only from sources
concentrated in the Galactic Center (GC); emission from sources uniformly distributed
over the Galactic Disk (GD); emission from sources distributed as the known visible
mass of Galaxy (GMD). In addition we have also included the non-Galactic model of
sources isotropically distributed around Earth (ISO). In this context, this latter model
can just be seen as an academic example to give a feeling of what the analysis method
would produce in such a scenario.
The pattern PM(i) of the two detectors Explorer and Nautilus to signals due to
these models are shown in Fig. 2. These patterns are all given as a function of the
sidereal time. PM(i) depends on the space and energy distributions of g.w. sources
described by a model, taking also into account the variation of the detector efficiency
with the sidereal time, due to the varying orientation of the antennae respect to the
sources. It depends also on the (unknown) energies of g.w. signals, on the noise,
and on the coordinates (latitude,longitude,azimuth) of the detectors on Earth. Simply
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Figure 2: Antenna patterns for the various models considered in the analysis. X-axis is the
sidereal time, given in hours. Y-axis is the antenna pattern for the coincident experiment
Nautilus-Explorer, normalized in terms of “efficiency of detection” (e.g. 0.25 means that,
on the average, we need 4 signals to see 1 signal) for signals as explained in the text.
speaking, for various models of the space distribution of sources of g.w., we expect
different responses from the coincidence experiment, i.e. different ‘antenna patterns’,
seen as a function of the sidereal time.
The calculation of PM(i) depends on the expected g.w. energy and some assump-
tions are needed. The signal’s amplitude h is unknown, and thus we have evaluated the
patterns by integrating over a uniform distribution of h values, ranging – on Earth –
from 1× 10−18 up to 3.0× 10−18. Different reasonings may be done here, leading to
different choices for the amplitudes range and for the distributions of the signals. We
have done the simplest choice, supposing that we do not know anything on the signals,
but the fact that no signals have been observed at the detectors with amplitude greater
than 3.0 × 10−18. The lowest limit has been chosen considering the fact that the de-
tector’s efficiencies below 1 × 10−18 is very small (less than ≈ 10%). Note that the
considered h values are based on ‘standard’ assumptions about the g.w. energy release
in cryogenic bars. The Galactic Disk (GD) model has been constructed considering
g.w. sources uniformly distributed over the Galactic plane, which means a distribution
of sources which is not uniform around the Earth, given the fact that the Earth is 8.5
kpc from the Center of Galaxy, which is the center of the disk (whose radius is 21 kpc).
The GMD distribution, taking into account the mass distribution in Galaxy, is much
more interesting than the GD model. In fact we do not expect a uniform distribution
of the sources over the GD, but a distribution which is concentrated near the GC [7].
4.2 Relative belief updating factor for a given model
Having introduced the general ideas, let us apply them to the data of our interest. In
the i-th bin in sidereal time (see Fig. 1) we have nc(i) observed coincidences, with an
4.2 Relative belief updating factor for a given model 8
expected number λB due to background and an expected number
λMS (i) = α× PM(i) (11)
due to the detectors response to g.w. signals, which depends on the model. The pa-
rameter α is proportional to the rate r of g.w. events, expressed as events/day, through
the following equation:
α×
∑
i
PM(i) = r × Tobs × ǫ ; α = r ×
Tobs
nbins
(12)
where ǫ is the “overall efficiency of detection”, Tobs the total observation time (which
is 90 days), nbins the number of bins. The overall efficiency of detection is calculated
from the antenna pattern as
ǫ =
∑nbins
i PM(i)
nbins × 1
(13)
which is the ratio of the area covered by the detectors and the area which would be
covered by ideal detectors (that is, having PM(i)=1 at all times). We have then the
following likelihood for each model:
LM(α) = f(Data |α,M) =
∏
i
e−λM(i) λM(i)
nc(i)
nc(i)!
, (14)
with
λM(i) = λB + λ
M
S (i) . (15)
λMS (i) is the parameter of the Poisson distribution that describes the g.w. signal given
model M. It can be said, in simple words, to be the number of g.w. events that could
be present in each bin in a coincidence experiment having performance and exposure
time as that described in Ref. [1]. Hence,
ngwc = α×
∑
i
PM(i) (16)
gives the total number of such g.w. events. This number is the sum of α over all the
bins, weighted with the pattern PM(i). Our interest is, via α, to infer ngwc and the
rate r. However, given the strong dependence of the inference from the priors, typical
for this kind of frontier measurements, we prefer to report the result in terms of R
functions, as discussed above. The resulting RM(α)’s are shown in Fig. 3. Note that
the figures are in log-log scale to make it clear that many orders of magnitude of α are
involved.
The results are summarized in Tab. 1. αML is the value that maximizes R. The
symbol ML reminds that αML is the value that maximizes the likelihood (likelihood
andR function differ by a factor). Indeed, this is the result that a Maximum Likelihood
(ML) analysis would produce for α. The parameter α is turned into g.w. rate using
Eq. (12). Rmax gives how much the belief for α = αML increases with respect to
α = 0. The higher relative belief updating factor is obtained for the Galactic Center
model. Within this model, the pdf for r around 1.2 events/day gets enhanced by a
factor 21 with respect to r = 0.
Figure 3 shows clearly how the initial beliefs about α (and therefore on r) are up-
dated, within each model. We want to stress that the final conclusion depends still on
the prior beliefs. If someone thought that α had to be above 10 this person had to
reconsider completely his/her beliefs, independently from the model; if another per-
son believed that only values below 0.01 were reasonable, the experiment would not
affect at all his/her beliefs, independently of the model. For this reason, the ML value
αML could be misleading if erroneously associated, as it often happens, to the value
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Figure 3: R function for the four models considered: Galactic Center (continuous); Galac-
tic Disk (dashed); GMD (dotted); isotropic (dot-dashed).
Table 1: Summary of R function for each model, together with the parametric inference
based on Maximum Likelihood or on the Bayes formula assuming a uniform prior for α.
Model GC GD GMD ISO∑
i P(i) 4.7 6.1 4.4 12
ǫ (%) 9.8 13 9.2 25
Rmax 21 7.2 8.2 1.9
(events)
αML 2.1 1.6 2.2 0.5
σML(α) 1.0 0.9 1.2 0.5
E[α | f◦(α) = k] 2.3 1.8 2.5 0.7
σ[α | f◦(α) = k] 1.0 0.9 1.2 0.4
(events)
ngwcML 10 10 10 7
σML(ngwc) 5 5 5 6
E[ngwc | f◦(α) = k] 11 11 11 9
σ[ngwc | f◦(α) = k] 5 6 5 5
(events/day)
rML 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.3
σML(r) 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3
E[r | f◦(α) = k] 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.4
σ[r | f◦(α) = k] 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.2
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around which our confidence is finally concentrated, independently from any prior
knowledge. Nevertheless, and with these warnings, we report in Tab. 1 also the results
obtained from a ML analysis and from a naı¨ve Bayesian inference that assumes a uni-
form prior onα (and therefore on r and ngwc, since they differ by factors). σML(α) has
been evaluated from the curvature of the minus-log-likelihood around its minimum, i.e.
σ−2ML = ∂
2/∂α2 (− ln L(α))|αML . The results of the ‘naı¨ve Bayesian inference’ are
reported as expected values E[·] and standard deviations evaluated from the final dis-
tribution. The condition f◦(α) has been written explicitly in E[·] and σ[·], according
to the Bayesian spirit. Note that, for obvious reasons, the mode of the posterior calcu-
lated using a uniform prior is exactly equivalent to the ML estimate. This observation
is important to understand the slightly different results obtained with the two methods.
The posterior expected value is always larger than the ML one, simply because of the
asymmetry of L.
Perhaps ngwc is the most interesting quantity to understand the conclusions of
these model dependent analyzes that, we like to repeat it, do not take properly into
account prior knowledge. The three physical model suggest about 10 coincidences
due to g.w.’s, with a 50% uncertainty. Instead, for the unphysical model (ISO) less
events are found and with larger uncertainty. Note that, for this model, the mode of the
posterior (or, equivalently, the ML estimate) gives a number of candidate events that is
the difference between the total number of observed events and that expected from the
background alone. Instead, for the three Galactic models, a number of events larger
than this difference is attributed to the signal, as a consequence of a ‘possibly good’
time modulation recognized in the data (in other words, the method ‘likes to think’
that, given a time distribution shape that reminds the pattern of the Galactic models,
the background has most likely under-fluctuated within what is reasonably allowed by
its probability distribution).
To summarize this subsection, the three Galactic models show good agreement in
indicating for which values of g.w. events, or event rate, we must increase our beliefs.
But the final beliefs depend on our initial ones, as explained introducing the Bayesian
approach. If you think that, given your best knowledge of the models of g.w.’s sources
and of g.w. interaction with cryogenic detectors, a g.w. rate on Earth of up to O(1)
event/day is quite possible, the data make you to believe that this rate is ≈ 1.0 ± 0.5
event/day and that they contain ≈ 10± 5 genuine g.w. coincidences.
4.3 Model comparison taking into account the a priori possible
values of the model parameters
While in the previous subsection we have been interested to learn about α or r within a
model (and then, since all results are conditioned by that model, it makes no sense from
that perspective to state if the model is right or wrong), let us see now how to modify our
beliefs on each model. This is a delicate question to be treated with care. Intuitively,
we can imagine that we have to make use of the R values, in the sense that the higher
is the value and the most ‘the hypothesis’ increases its credibility. The crucial point is
to understand that ‘the hypothesis’ is, indeed, a complex (somewhat multidimensional)
hypothesis. Another important point is that, given a non null background and the
properties of the Poisson distribution, we are never certain that the observations are
not due to background alone (this is the reason why theR function does not vanish for
α→ 0).
The first point can be well understood making an example based on Fig. 3 and
Tab. 1. Comparing RML for the different models one could come to the rash con-
clusion that the Galactic Center model is enhanced by 21 with respect to the non g.w.
hypothesis, or that the Galactic Center model is enhanced by a factor 21/7 with respect
to the hypothesis of signals from sources uniformly distributed over the Galactic Disk.
However these conclusions would be correct only in the case that each model would
4.3 Model comparison taking into account the a priori possible values of the model
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admit only that value of the parameter which maximizesR, i.e.
BFGC(α=2.1), GD(α=1.6) =
f(Data |GC, α = 2.1)
f(Data |GD, α = 1.6)
(17)
=
f(Data |GC,α=2.1)
f(Data |BKGD alone)
f(Data |GD,α=1.6)
f(Data |BKGD alone)
=
RGC(2.1)
RGD(1.6)
≈
21
7
= 3.
But we are, indeed, interested in BFGC ,GD and not in BFGC(α=2.1), GD(α=1.6). We
must take into account the fact that a wide range of α values could be associated to
each model.
Let us take the Bayes factor defined in Eq. (7). The probability theory teaches us
promptly what to do when each model depends on parameters:
P (Data |M) =
∫
P (Data |M, θ) f(θ) dθ , (18)
where θ stands for the set of the model parameters and f(θ) for their pdf. Applying
this formula to the Bayes factors of our interest we get
BFMi,Mj =
P (Data |Mi)
P (Data |Mj)
=
∫
LMi(α ; Data) f◦Mi (α) dα∫
LMj (α ; Data) f◦Mj (α) dα
(19)
where f◦(α) is the (model dependent) prior about α. Note that the Bayes factors with
respect toM0 =”background alone” get the simple expression
BFM,M0 =
∫
RM(α) f◦M(α) dα . (20)
Equation (19) shows that the ‘goodness’ of the model depends on the integrated likeli-
hood ∫
LM(α ; Data) f◦M(α) dα (21)
which is sometimes called ‘evidence’ (in the sense that “the higher is this number, the
higher is the evidence that the data provide in favor of the model”). It is important
to note that LM(α ; Data) has its maximum value around the ML point αML, but
Eq. (21) takes into account all prior possibilities of the parameter. Thus, in general, it
is not enough that one model fits the data better than its alternative (think, e.g., at the
minimum χ2 as a measure of fit goodness) to prefer finally that model. First there are
the model priors, which we have to take into account. Second, the evidence (21) takes
into account the parameter space preferred by the likelihood (i.e. the values around the
ML point) with respect to the parameter space allowed a priori by the model. In the
extreme case, one could have a model that can fit ‘perfectly’ the experimental data after
having adjusted dozens of parameters, but this model yields a very small ‘evidence’
and it is therefore disregarded. This automatic filtering against complicated models is
a nice feature of the Bayesian theory and reminds the Ockham’ Razor criterion [9].
To better understand the role of the parameter prior in Eq. (21), let us take the
example of a model (which we do not consider realistic and, hence, we have discarded
a priori in our analysis) that gives a signal only in one of the 1/2 hours bins, being all
bins a priori equally possible. This model Ms would depend on two parameters, α
and ts, where ts is the center of the time bin. Considering α and ts independent, the
parameter prior is f◦(α, ts) = f◦(α) · f◦(ts), where f◦(ts) = 1/48 is a probability
function for the discrete variable ts. The ‘evidence’ for this model would be
∑
ts
∫
LMs(α, ts ; Data) f◦(α) f◦(ts) dα =
∑
ts
1
48
∫
LMs(α, ts ; Data) f◦(α) dα
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If the data show a very large peak in correspondence of ts = tsML , we have that
LMs(α, tsML ; Data)≫ LMs(α, ts 6= tsML ; Data) and then
∑
ts
∫
LMs(α, ts ; Data) f◦(α) f◦(ts) dα ≈
1
48
∫
LMs(α, tsML ; Data) f◦(α) dα
This model is automatically suppressed by a factor ≈ 48 with respect to other models
that do not have the time position as free parameter. Note that this suppression goes in
the same direction of the reasoning described in Sec. 3.3. But the Bayesian approach
tells us when and how this suppression has to be applied. Certainly not in the Galactic
models we are considering.
As we have seen, while the Bayes factors for simple hypotheses (‘simple’ in the
sense that they have no internal parameters) provide a prior-free information of how
to modify the beliefs, in the case of models with free parameters Bayes factors remain
independent from the beliefs about the models, but do depend on the priors about the
model parameters. In our case they depend on the priors about α, which might be dif-
ferent for different models. If we were comparing different models, each with its f◦(α)
about which there is full agreement in the scientific community, all further calculations
would be straightforward. However, we do not think to be in such a nice text-book sit-
uation, dealing with open problems in frontier physics (for example, note that α, and
then r and ngwc, depend on the g.w. cross section on cryogenic bars, and we do not
believe that the understanding of the underlying mechanisms is completely settled). In
principle every physicist which have formed his/her ideas about some model and its
parameters should insert his/her functions in the formulae and see from the result how
he/she should change his/her opinion about the different models. Virtually our task
ends here, having given theR functions, which can be seen as the best summary of an
experimental fact, and having indicated how to proceed (for recent examples of appli-
cations of this method in astrophysics and cosmology see Refs. [10, 11, 12]). Indeed,
we proceed, showing how beliefs can change given some possible scenarios for f◦(α).
The first scenario is that in which the possible value of α are considered so small
that f◦(α) is equal to zero for α > 0.01. The result is simple: the data are irrelevant
and beliefs on the different models are not updated by the data.
Other scenarios might allow the possibility that f◦(α) is positive for values up to
O(1) and more. We shall use three different pdf’s for α as examples of prior beliefs,
that we call ‘sceptical’, ‘moderate’ and ’uniform’ (up to α = 10). The ‘moderate’ pdf
corresponds to a rate which is rapidly going to zero around the value which we have
measured. The initial pdf is modeled with a half-Gaussian with σ = 1. The ‘sceptical’
pdf has a σ ten times smaller. The ‘uniform’ considers equally likely all α up to the
last decade in which theR functions are sizable different from zero. Here are the three
f◦(α):
f◦(α | sceptical) ∝ N (0, 0.1) (α > 0) (22)
f◦(α |moderate) ∝ N (0, 1) (α > 0) (23)
f◦(α | uniform) = k (0 < α < 10) , (24)
whereN (µ, σ) stands for a Gaussian distribution. For simplicity, we use the same sets
of priors for all models, though they could, and probably should, be different for each
model. But we think that this is sufficient for the purpose of this exercise, which is that
of illustrating the method.
Using these three pdf’s for the parameter α, we can finally calculate all Bayes
factors. We report in Tab. 2 the Bayes factors of the models of Fig. 2 with respect
to model M0 = “only background”, using Eq. (20). All other Bayes factors can
be calculated as ratio of these. The interpretation of the numbers is straightforward,
remembering Eq. (5). If the preference was for α values below 0.1 (the ‘sceptical’), the
data produce a Bayes factor just above 1 for all models, indicating that the experiment
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Table 2: Bayes factors, for the four models of Fig. 2 with respect to model M0 = “only
background” depending on three choices for f◦(α). The thumbnails showing f◦(α) are
log-log plots with abscissa scales exactly as in Fig. 3.
‘sceptical’ ‘moderate’ ‘uniform’
f0(α)
Model
0.01 0.1 1 10
0.01
0.1
1
10
0.01 0.1 1 10
0.01
0.1
1
10
0.01 0.1 1 10
0.01
0.1
1
10
5 10 15 20 24
sth
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.3
Signal
1.3 8.4 5.4
5 10 15 20 24
sth
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.3
Signal
1.4 4.1 1.7
5 10 15 20 24
sth
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.3
Signal
1.2 3.9 2.6
5 10 15 20 24
sth
0.1
0.2
0.3
Signal
1.2 1.4 0.2
has slightly increased our conviction, but essentially there is no model particularly
preferred. If, instead, we think, though with low probability that even values of α
above 1 are possible (i.e. r & 0.5 event/day), then Bayes factors are obtained which
that can sizable increase our suspicion that some events could be really due to one
of these models.1 Within this ‘moderate’ scenario there is some preference for the
Galactic Center model with a Bayes factor about 2 with respect to each other model.
This result contradict the naı¨ve judgment based on observation of a ‘peak’ at around
4:00. The response of the Bayesian comparison takes into account all features of the
model pattern, including the width of the peaks.
We have also considered a prior which is uniform in log(α), between α = (0.001−
10). This prior accords equal probability to each decade in the parameter α, and prob-
ably accords many people prior intuition. Bayes factors, for the four models of Fig. 2
with respect to modelM0 = “only background”, are:
4.0 (GC); 2.0 (GD); 2.2 (GMD); 1.0 (ISO).
Again, within this scenario there is some preference for the Galactic Center model
with a Bayes factor about 2 with respect to each other model.
5 Conclusion and discussion
This paper is mainly on methodological issues related to model comparisons in critical,
frontier physics cases where the prior knowledge is relevant.
1To understand the quantitative role of the Bayes factors, let us make some examples: 8.4 means that if
someone was in serious doubt to believe or not (i.e. P = 50%), in the light of the data his/her belief increases
to 89%. A BF of 100 would make the same person ‘practically sure’ (99%), or would bring into serious doubt
a sceptical person (who had an initial belief of 1%).
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We have given reasons of why ‘conventional statistics’ (i.e. the collection of fre-
quentistic prescriptions) does not adequately approach the problem of model compar-
ison, mainly because of impossibility of classify hypotheses in a probability scale and
of the pretension that good criteria to state what is ‘significant’ can be derived from
the properties of the null hypothesis alone, without considering the details of the alter-
native hypotheses.2
Within the so called Bayesian framework, we have started from the basic obser-
vation that the most a probability theory should do is to provide rules to modify our
beliefs on the light of experimental data. Beliefs can be about the values of the param-
eters of a model or about alternative models. As far as beliefs on model parameters
are concerned, we have shown that the likelihood, rescaled to its insensitivity limit
value (theR function, or ‘relative belief updating factor’), represents a good, prior in-
dependent way of summarizing the information contained in the data with respect to a
given model. Indeed, when this method is applied to the Explorer-Nautilus data, from
the visual inspection of the R function the reader gets, for each model, an immediate
overview of what the data say about the number of events involved in the observation.
The α values for which the relative belief updating factor is maximum correspond to a
total number of g.w. events in the data (ngwc) about 10 for all three Galactic models.
For those who share beliefs that numbers of this order of magnitude or more are pos-
sible (and that one of the three models is the correct one), theR can be translated into
a result ngwc ≈ 10± 5 (or a rate on Earth of ≈ 1.0± 0.5).
Going to the model comparison, we have shown the unavoidable complication due
to the fact that each model depends on a free parameter (α) and, hence, the Bayes
factors depend on the prior pdf of this parameter, i.e. f◦M(α). Since the models used
do not come with a kind of reference f◦M(α) (we hope that more work will be done in
this direction) we had to do some choices and we have given the results under different
scenarios, from the most negative one (“there is no chance that the models produce
something observable, given the present energy sensitivity”) to some others in which
α above 1 are conceivable (described by the priors we have called in the text ‘moderate’
and ’uniform’). Given these scenarios the Galactic Center model gets preferred over
the others by a Bayes factor of about 2:1.
We would like to end replying to the objection, arisen often in discussions, that “the
plot with coincidences grouped in bins of sidereal time provides the same information
of that in which coincidences are grouped in bins of solar time”. This might be true
if one is blindly looking for “statistical significance”, following strictly frequentistic
prescriptions, which, as explained above, we do not consider the proper way to go.
To answer this objection we have done the exercise of applying exactly the same
analysis with the same models to the data grouped in bins of solar time. The results
are given in Fig. 4 and Tab. 3, which have the analogous meaning of Fig. 3 and Tab. 2.
TheR functions do not show values of α particularly preferred by the data: they have
approximately a smoothed step-function shape which divides the orders of magnitudes
of α (on the right side) that are excluded from those in which the experiment loses
sensitivity. This is more ore less what we could get distributing 34 entries in 48 bins
according to a multinomial distribution: small differences in the shape of RM(α)
depend on the individual occurrence of the multinomial data set (but never forget that
the multinomial distribution does not forbid strong clustering of the entries around one
bin!).
The lesson from this exercise is that the Explorer-Nautilus 2001 data, plotted as
a function of a sensible physical quantity and compared with physically motivated
models, does not provide the same information of any random sample. Indeed, the
evidence in support of the models is not enough to modify strongly our beliefs, but it
is certainly at the level of “stay tuned”, waiting for results of the 2003 run.
2If you are puzzled by the question “why do frequentistic hypothesis test often work?”, you might give a
look at Chap. 10 of Ref. [2].
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Figure 4: Same as Fig. 3, but for data grouped in solar time bins
.
Table 3: Same as Tab. 2, but for data grouped in solar time bins
‘sceptical’ ‘moderate’ ‘uniform’
f0(α)
Model
0.01 0.1 1 10
0.01
0.1
1
10
0.01 0.1 1 10
0.01
0.1
1
10
0.01 0.1 1 10
0.01
0.1
1
10
5 10 15 20 24
sth
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.3
Signal
1.0 0.5 0.1
5 10 15 20 24
sth
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.3
Signal
1.1 1.2 0.3
5 10 15 20 24
sth
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.3
Signal
1.0 0.9 0.2
5 10 15 20 24
sth
0.1
0.2
0.3
Signal
1.2 1.2 0.2
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